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rate ‘common order.’ Increasing interdependencies in the EU have forced all EU member states to collaborate and share
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1. Introduction
Existing literature presents European integration as a
major challenge toNordic cooperation: As European inte-
gration has progressed, the Nordic political order has
arguably lost some of its relevance (Olesen & Strang,
2016; Strang, 2016; Sverdrup, 1998). However, political
orders could potentially coexist: Being part of a larger
political order does not necessarily dissolve pre-existing
political networks. The Nordic states could maintain a
Nordic nucleus within the larger European setting. In this
article, we examine whether and how Nordic coopera-
tion coexists with European integration by taking a net-
work perspective.
Three different expectations on Nordic cooperation
concerning European integration can be derived from
existing literature. Firstly, Nordic cooperation has been
characterised as particularly informal and widespread
across the national administrations (Sundelius, 1977;
Sundelius & Wiklund, 1979, 2000), leaving it rather
unaffected by further European integration. Secondly,
increased cooperation on a European level may make
broad cooperation easier and more attractive than
interactions amongst the Nordics only (Strang, 2016).
As a result, European cooperation may inhibit Nordic
cooperation by weakening the political will and oppor-
tunity to act regionally (Sverdrup, 1998). Thirdly, in
line with theories on differentiated integration (Leruth,
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Gänzle, & Trondal, 2019; Schimmelfennig, Leuffen, &
Rittberger, 2015), the strength of Nordic cooperation
may differ across policy areas because of the varying
degrees of institutionalisation through which integration
has processed.
Nordic cooperation has long roots. Key institu-
tional developments took place before or alongside
European economic integration. A first, Nordic Social-
Political meeting was held in Copenhagen in 1919, with
the aim to coordinate the Nordic approaches to the
first International Labour Organization conference to
be held the same year (Kettunen, Lundberg, Österberg,
& Petersen, 2016). The Nordic countries were first
movers in establishing free movement across borders.
Already back in 1943, Sweden had abolishedwork permit
requirement for citizens from Denmark, Finland, Iceland
and Norway and, between 1952 and 1957, require-
ments for visas and passports were gradually abolished
between the Nordic countries (Tervonen, 2016). The
Nordic Council, established in 1952, became a driv-
ing force behind further institutionalisation (Olesen &
Strang, 2016, p. 29). In 1954, a common labour mar-
ket was agreed upon. The adoption of the Nordic Social
Security Convention in 1955 paved the way for equal
treatment of Nordic Citizens in terms of welfare rights
across the region. In 1957, furthermore, the treaty estab-
lishing a Nordic passport union was signed.
These far-reaching agreements paved the way for
regular interaction among Nordic politicians and gov-
ernmental organisations (Kettunen et al., 2016; Strang,
2016). This has led to well-established cooperation
between state representatives at both the official and
semi-official level (Kettunen et al., 2016, p. 86). At the
same time, Nordic economic cooperation as a sepa-
rate economic order never really institutionalised. In the
1950s, a plan for a Nordic customs union was negoti-
ated, running parallel to the drafting of the European
Economic Community. The plan was, however, buried
in the light of European developments. Later, at the
end of the 1960s, a plan for a Nordic Economic
Community (NORDEK) was drafted, but never signed
(Strang, 2016, p. 5).
Overall, Nordic cooperation has been challenged by
parallel European integration. In 1973, Denmark became
a member of the European Community, followed by
Sweden and Finland in 1995. Norway and Iceland remain
outside, but are members of the European Economic
Area (EEA) and thus members of the internal market,
the rules of which they have to apply. As European
integration progressed and took over as a dominant
theme in Nordic Council meetings (Olesen & Strang,
2016, p. 33), it increasingly overshadowed Nordic coop-
eration (Kettunen et al., 2016; Olesen & Strang, 2016;
Tervonen, 2016).
In this article, we examine Nordic cooperation
in three European Administrative Networks (EANs).
The networks relate to policy areas that display a vari-
ant degree of EU involvement, from “limited EU poli-
cy involvement,” i.e., health and welfare, to “consider-
able EU involvement,” i.e., internal market (Buonanno
& Nugent, 2013, pp. 7, 11). The first network is
the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of
Social Security Systems (AC). Being established in 1958,
the network is one of the oldest EANs. The network
assists the Commission on Regulation 883/2004 concern-
ing welfare across borders, i.e., the rights of European
citizens to social security when they reside or work in
another member state. The task of the Administrative
Commission is to facilitate the uniform application of
Community Law. To do so, it may issue recommenda-
tions and make decisions on how the articles of the rel-
evant EU regulation shall be interpreted and applied.
It is thus a forum for both information exchange and
problem-solving.
The second network is the cross-border healthcare
(CBHC) expert group, established as part of the Patients’
Rights Directive 2011/24 (PRD). The role of this net-
work is to assist the Commission on the implementa-
tion of the PRD, laying down the rules and conditions
when European citizens seek planned healthcare treat-
ment in another member state. The network foremost
exchanges information between participants and has no
direct problem-solving function.
The third network is SOLVIT. This network was set
up in 2001 to address misapplication of internal market
law. SOLVIT is a problem-solving network and has consid-
erable competences in terms of case handling. The net-
work consists of national SOLVIT centres. Citizens or busi-
nesses can submit cases concerning the misapplication
of internal market law to the SOLVIT centre in the coun-
try where one resides or the business is established. This
SOLVIT centre then is to contact the SOLVIT centre in the
member state where the alleged misapplication has tak-
en place. Consecutively, the two SOLVIT centres have to
examine the case, aiming to solve misapplication if this
is uncovered.
In all three networks, networkmembersmay interact
in a plenum, in subgroups, or bilaterally—between those
involved in a specific case or an issue addressed. These
interactions can have different aims. To begin with, they
may aim at solving problems related to the interpreta-
tion or application of EU rules. Furthermore, interactions
may aim at the exchange of information, of advice on the
interpretation or application of EU rules, or of best prac-
tices for doing so.
We collected data on all four types of interaction:
problem-solving, exchange of information, exchange of
advice and exchange of best practices.We did so by using
a self-developed survey to map out the structure of each
network. By adopting a social network approach, we
put the bilateral interactions of transnational bureaucra-
cy (Strang, 2016; Sundelius, 1977; Sundelius & Wiklund,
1979, 2000) at the centre of our analysis, allowing us to
assess whether there is indeed a tendency to ‘go Nordic’
in EANs. We study the strength of Nordic cooperation
in each network by visualising network interactions to
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detect the existence of a separateNordic community and
to test whether interactions cluster among Nordic net-
work members.
We find that, despite long-lived European integra-
tion, there is still a strong Nordic community within
the broader European political order. Nordic coopera-
tion and European integration coexist, without the lat-
ter crowding out the former. However, our findings also
show that the strength of Nordic cooperation is differen-
tiated (Leruth et al., 2019; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015):
It depends on the level of institutionalisation, which
varies across policy areas.
In the following sections, we first set out our the-
oretical argument and expectations on the strength of
Nordic cooperation in EANs. After discussing transgov-
ernmental cooperation in EANsmore generally and fram-
ing Nordic cooperation as informal transgovernmental-
ism, we develop three different expectations on Nordic
cooperation in light of European integration. The subse-
quent section details our methodology, data collection
and operationalisation. Next, we discuss the results from
our study in terms of both the visualisation of detected
communities within the networks and the significance of
Nordic cooperation. Finally, we discuss the implications
of our findings in the conclusion.
2. Theory
2.1. Nordic Cooperation in European Administrative
Networks
This article analyses Nordic cooperation against the back-
ground of ever-increasing European integration. Since
its inception, European integration has extended in
scope and substance, with the European Commission
as the core executive. However, in light of its extensive
legislative and administrative tasks, the Commission’s
resources and formal competences are limited, especial-
ly in the realm of policy implementation and enforce-
ment. It therefore depends strongly on cooperation
with national administrations to realise its functions and
objectives (Mastenbroek & Martinsen, 2018; Trondal &
Peters, 2013). This form of regular and multilevel coop-
eration occurs in what has been termed as the European
Administrative Space (EAS; Hofmann, 2008; Olsen, 2003)
or an emergent European Executive Order (Trondal,
2010). The EAS has institutionalised a common adminis-
trative capacity, driven by the interactions between the
Commission and national administrative organisations.
The EAS has been defined as a space “in which increas-
ingly integrated administrations jointly exercise powers
delegated to the EU in a system of shared sovereignty,”
marked by “a high degree of close administrative coop-
eration between all levels of member states’ administra-
tions with the European institutions and bodies in var-
ious policy phases” (Hofmann, 2008, p. 662). Seconded
National Experts, European agencies and EU committees
are important parts of the EAS in EU agenda-setting and
decision-making processes (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009;
Trondal, 2010; Trondal & Peters, 2013). Also, EANs play
an important role in the implementation and enforce-
ment of EU policies (Mastenbroek & Martinsen, 2018).
EANs are key components of the EAS. They can be
defined as “networks that consist of institutional rep-
resentatives of national executives—primarily depart-
ments and/or agencies—with tasks in the realm of
national implementation or enforcement of EU policies”
(Mastenbroek & Martinsen, 2018, p. 423). While dis-
playing differences in organisation and structure, EANs
share two key features: Their members are civil ser-
vants and they are tasked with improving the national
implementation and enforcement of EU policies. In both
respects, EANs are similar to transgovernmental net-
works, which the International Relations literature has
presented (Bach & Newman, 2010; Eberlein & Newman,
2008; Slaughter, 2004). EANs are mostly transgovern-
mental in the sense that they are constituted by nation-
al and EU governmental actors, represented by civil
servants meeting with their peers from other mem-
ber states.
In terms of tasks, EANs deal with a fundamen-
tal dilemma of supranational governance. On the one
hand, states are increasingly interdependent and com-
mit themselves to cross-border cooperation,which trans-
lates in international norms, rules and policies. On the
other hand, they are reluctant to delegate the compe-
tencies required for the implementation of these inter-
national agreements, which thus remain at the nation-
al level. To escape this supranational governance dilem-
ma, EANs are to assist the Commission in overseeing the
implementation and enforcement of EU rules. Network
interactions are supposed to attenuate national interests
and instead establish an enabling environment for the
implementation and enforcement ofmutual agreements
(Eberlein & Newman, 2008).
The more specific functions of EANs and the rela-
tional structure between actors are likely to differ
across networks. In terms of functions, it matters what
flows in the network, i.e., what characterises interac-
tions. Some networks are primarily information-based.
These are labelled information networks (Slaughter,
2004, p. 56). Here, actors exchange information about
implementation and enforcement practices and chal-
lenges. Additionally, participants may exchange best
practices, or seek advice fromother peers on how to deal
with implementation/enforcement problems. Other net-
works have problem-solving competences. They may
solve cases on misapplied EU law or issue administra-
tive decisions on how to interpret or implement specif-
ic articles in a legal act. Both information networks and
problem-solving networks are regarded as key to learn-
ing. Regular network cooperation teaches actors about
new or different approaches to implementation-related
problems and facilitate expert-driven policy learning
(Vantaggiato, 2019). By exchanging their ways of doing
things, actors learn from one another.
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The relational structure of networks, as constitut-
ed by network interactions, also varies. This structure
may be largely horizontal, with network members inter-
acting amongst each other on equal terms and to the
same extent (Slaughter, 2004; Slaughter & Hale, 2010).
Alternatively, networks may develop a more asymmet-
ric or vertical structure, the Commission or a member
state representative constituting a nodal position, some-
times to the extent of becoming the “teacher of norms”
(Versluis & Tarr, 2013). The structure of a network is
important because the central actors in a network are
more likely to control interactions. This allows them to
put a substantive mark on interactions, deciding what
constitutes relevant information or what is a best prac-
tice, as well as allowing them to provide advice to oth-
er actors. They thus become more in charge of defin-
ing problems and solutions, which is by no means neu-
tral but instead a rather powerful position from which
to influence European integration. Controlling and dis-
tributing information matters.
The internal structure of a network thus informs us
about the power distribution in a network. The rela-
tional structure offers an opportunity structure to mem-
bers, which they can use to set agendas and control
how resources, such as information, best practices and
advice, are shared between actors (Vantaggiato, Kassim,
& Wright, 2020). Yet, the relational structure of a net-
work can also be clustered. Some clusters may be rather
insulated from the rest of the network, being incapable
or unwilling to reach out. Likeminded states may seek
one another and, instead of learning across differences
(Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008), they will primarily turn to their
counterparts with whom they already share experiences
to solve problems and exchange information, best prac-
tices and advice.
2.2. Nordic Cooperation as Informal
Transgovernmentalism
The case of Nordic cooperation fits well with the con-
cept of transgovernmental relations, which refers to
interactions among administrative units of national gov-
ernments (Keohane & Nye, 1974). As emphasised by
Sundelius (1977) and Sundelius and Wiklund (2000),
Nordic relations are rather treated as an extension of
domestic policymaking than handled through a single
foreign policy channel. They found that interactions are
mainly informal, i.e., without formal decision-making
authority, and take place predominantly among nation-
al civil servants handling day-to-day activities. In doing
so, civil servants in governmental sub-unitsmaintain con-
siderable independence vis-à-vis their political principals.
Crucially, Nordic cooperation takes place through such
transgovernmental interactions between the respec-
tive administrations. These interactions are broad in
scope and run deep inside the national bureaucracies
(Sundelius &Wiklund, 1979, 2000). Informal interactions
and cooperative behaviour among Nordic officials are
stimulated through socialisation processes, enabled by
regular meetings and social activities enhancing social
and personal relations among them (Sundelius, 1977).
Moreover, more informal cooperation inspired the
institutionalisation of the Nordic community in the first
place. Instead of constituting a basis for transgovernmen-
tal interactions amongst Nordic states, these institution-
alised structures were established to codify existing prac-
tices and to facilitate greater coordination (Sundelius &
Wiklund, 1979, 2000). In turn, the institutionalisation of
regular meetings enhanced interactions and continuous
contacts (Sundelius & Wiklund, 1979, 2000). The impor-
tance of these informal bilateral interactions among the
Nordics has been emphasised by Ojanen (1999). In her
view, informal cooperation in the Nordic community
takes place to a greater extent than formal cooperation;
informal links being the norm and ideal for Nordic coop-
eration. She posits that these bilateral relations are a
result of existing parallel national structures in Nordic
administrations, which make it easy to identify the right
counterpart. These bilateral relations also function as a
driver for bringing Nordic administrations closer togeth-
er (Ojanen, 1999).
While Nordic cooperation is mostly studied as mul-
tilateral coordination, there has been a plea for a more
systematic analysis of the bilateral relations within the
Nordic community (Strang, 2016). The appeal to map
interaction patterns has been echoed in studies on
EANs more generally (Mastenbroek & Martinsen, 2018;
Vantaggiato, 2019). It is not only important to see how
frequently national administrations interact and about
what (Sundelius, 1977), but also crucial to see who
interacts with whom and for which purpose (Martinsen,
Schrama, & Mastenbroek, 2020). Along these lines,
Nordic cooperation can take the character of a set of
bilateral interactions between national administrations.
2.3. Nordic Cooperation in Light of European Integration
We develop three expectations on Nordic cooperation
in light of European integration. First, the informal char-
acter of transgovernmental relations among the Nordics
could be an asset for Nordic cooperation, despite more
European integration. While European integration is
based on more formal commitments to a supranational
union, not allowing formal groupings of countries, Nordic
cooperation is characterised mostly by the joint manage-
ment of relations among Nordic administrations on the
subnational level (Ojanen, 1999). In that sense, the EU
does not inhibit the interactions among the Nordics, and
European integration should not pose a threat to Nordic
cooperation. Even more so, it is common for like-minded
countries to cooperate more within the EU, particularly
within EANs (Martinsen et al., 2020; Vantaggiato, 2019).
We expect that the long history of informal coopera-
tion has deepened Nordic transgovernmental relations
(Ojanen, 1999; Sundelius & Wiklund, 1979). We thus
assume Nordic cooperation to be particularly ‘strong,’
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meaning that it is more straightforward for civil servants
to interact with their Nordic counterparts instead of their
European ones:
Expectation 1: Nordic cooperation is strong across pol-
icy areas.
Instead, we may expect Nordic cooperation to be
stronger in some policy areas than others. In line with
theories on differentiated integration (Leruth et al.,
2019; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015), the level of integra-
tion can be assumed to differ across policy areas. In par-
ticular, we expect that the extent of institutionalisation
in a particular area affects the strength of Nordic coop-
eration. Existing institutionalisation begets interaction.
The institutionalisation of Nordic cooperation consists of
three major achievements, namely: a passport union, a
common labour market and the social security conven-
tion (Kettunen et al., 2016). Other types of free move-
ment, however, never materialised on the Nordic lev-
el, but rather on the European level in the form of the
European internal market. Instead, the Nordics have a
long tradition of free movement of people, labour and
the development of a distinct, Nordic type of welfare
state. Because of this deep institutionalisation on the
Nordic level, state representatives at both the official and
semi-official level have established continued coopera-
tion (Kettunen et al., 2016). In addition to already estab-
lished institutional cooperation in certain policies, insti-
tutional similarity may tie Nordic representatives tighter
together. Rose (1993) argues that, due to similarity in
economic resources and closeness in both ideology and
geography, the Nordics are particularly well suited for
lesson-drawing across borders.
More recently, similar arguments and empirical
accounts about the importance of institutional similarity
for cooperation have been put forward in the literature
on transgovernmental cooperation (Efrat & Newman,
2016, 2017) and EANs (Martinsen et al., 2020; Van Der
Heijden, 2019; Vantaggiato, 2019). The familiarity of insti-
tutions and similarity of domestic experiences and com-
mon challenges facilitate interaction and the exchange of
resources across national administrations. A Nordicmod-
el of welfare, including health, is often presented to exist
where common social norms and institutions are shared,
andwhich is characterised by relatively generouswelfare
protection, an encompassing national health service sys-
tem, tax-financing and universal coverage of the popu-
lation (Bambra, 2007; Kettunen et al., 2016; Martinsen
et al., 2020; Wendt, 2009). Therefore, deeply institution-
alised Nordic models in areas of health and welfare poli-
cies will make it particularly easy for civil servants from
the Nordics to interact with one another. On the other
hand, apart from the free movement of persons, oth-
er types of free movement did not materialise at the
Nordic level but developed first and foremost in the
European internal market. Also, Nordic economic coop-
eration as a separate economic order has not institution-
alised.We expect this lack of institutionalisedNordic eco-
nomic cooperation to affect civil servant interaction in
the area of the internal market:
Expectation 2: Nordic cooperation is stronger in areas
of health and welfare policy than in the area of inter-
nal market policy.
At the same time, Strang (2016, p. 17) rightly asks:
“Why would a Dane cooperate with a Finn, instead of
a German?” In other words, are the Nordics more inte-
grated amongst themselves than with other EU member
states? There are three reasons for a potential crowding-
out effect of European integration on Nordic coopera-
tion. First, increased involvement in EANs makes it eas-
ier to interact with states beyond the Nordics (Strang,
2016). This renders Nordic cooperation less relevant.
Transgovernmental cooperation thus becomes increas-
ingly less uniquelyNordic (Browning, 2007; Lawler, 1997).
Second, increased European integration may even inhib-
it Nordic cooperation, as it weakens the political will and
opportunity to act regionally. Further institutionalisation
of the European Union is argued to lead to the demise of
formal cooperation among the Nordics (Sverdrup, 1998).
The constant deepening of European integration has
increased the interdependencies of Nordic states with
non-Nordic EUmembers and providedmost policy issues
with both a Nordic and an EU dimension (Olesen &
Strang, 2016). In sum, deepening European integration
has affected the political motivation and the opportu-
nity structures for interaction and exchange among the
Nordics. As a result, we may expect that there is no sig-
nificantly stronger cooperation among the Nordics than
among all European network members:
Expectation 3: Cooperation is not stronger among
Nordics than across the rest of Europe.
In the next section, we discuss the methods we use to
put these expectations to the test.
3. Methods
3.1. Social Network Analysis
To gain insight into the degree of Nordic cooperation in
the context of European integration we use social net-
work analysis. This method allows us to place bilateral
interactions among administrative units in the Nordics
and all EU member states at the centre of analysis.
The pattern of interactions forms a network in which
each national administrative unit is positioned concern-
ing its counterparts. The network data enables us to do
two separate analyses.
First, we will visualise network interactions and run
a community-detection algorithm to ascertain whether
the administrative units of the Nordic states can be cap-
tured as a separate community of preferred partners
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within the overall network. Communities in networks
can be defined as subnetworks in which the interac-
tions within are denser than the interactions outside
of it (Murata, 2010). In other words, such clusters of
national administrative units are more closely related to
each other than they are with other counterparts in the
network. To detect such communities we use an algo-
rithm, called walktrap, which randomly ‘walks’ through
the network until it gets ‘trapped’ into a densely connect-
ed subnetwork (Pons & Latapy, 2005, p. 1). Simply put,
the walktrap algorithm runs short random walks across
four ties from one network member to another as it cal-
culates the modularity score. This score measures the
degree to which each tie falls within a certain commu-
nity compared to what you would expect if ties were
distributed at random. This type of bottom-up cluster
analysis seeks to optimise the modularity score to iter-
atively detect the number of communities present in the
network (Murata, 2010). After running the community-
detection algorithm, we visualise the network of inter-
actions and colour each separate community to see
whether the Nordics indeed tend to belong to the same
community or subnetwork.
Next, we use Exponential Random Graph Models to
test whether Nordic cooperation is significantly more
likely than cooperation among national administrative
units across Europe. These models are appropriate for
analysing the inherently relational structure of networks
(Handcock, Hunter, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2008).
They enable us to explicitly model the likelihood that
the Nordics interact with one another instead of with
other national administrative units. Interactions can take
on several different forms; counterparts can exchange
information, advice or best practices, but they can also
engage with one another to solve problems related to
their administrative tasks. We model each interaction
type separately for all different EANs in our study.
3.2. Data Collection and Operationalisation
We collected the data on each interaction type for the
EANs across the policy domains using our own online
survey tool. We distributed the surveys to one repre-
sentative from each member of the network separately
for SOLVIT, the Administrative Commission and the CBHC
expert group.
In each survey, we asked the respondents with which
other national representatives they were most frequent-
ly in contact to exchange 1) advice, 2) best practices,
3) information and 4) to resolve problems concerning
their relevant administrative tasks. We treat all network
interactions as non-directed network ties. For exam-
ple, if a national representative in Sweden indicated an
exchange of information with a national representative
in Norway, we assume that both were involved in this
relationship. Each type of bilateral interaction results in a
distinct adjacency matrix for every EAN. We used these
matrices to visualise the networks and their communi-
ties and included them as the dependent variables in our
Exponential Random Graph Models.
We conducted the survey on SOLVIT among all
national SOLVIT centres in 2018, with a response rate of
97%.We did not receive a response from Iceland.We dis-
tributed a similar design survey among national repre-
sentatives of the Administrative Commission in 2018,
with a response rate of 100%. In 2019, we conducted
our survey on the national representatives of the CBHC
expert group, reaching a response rate of 87%. We did
not receive a response from Croatia, Iceland, Spain and
the United Kingdom. Such high response rates are suf-
ficient to accurately represent and model the networks
as if they were complete (Borgatti, 2006). Unfortunately,
we do miss information on the position of Iceland in the
network of the CBHC expert group; they neither partici-
pated in the survey nor were named by other members
as most frequent contacts. Also, Norway and Iceland are
not members of the Administrative Commission, where
they only have observer status.
To test whether the Nordics interact significantly
more with one another than with any other network
member, we created a variable indicating which mem-
ber is Nordic (coded as 1) and which member is not
(coded as 0). We defined Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden and Iceland as Nordic states. In the Exponential
Random Graph Models, we included Nordic cooperation
as a dyadic attribute, indicating all interactions among
the Nordics compared to interactions with non-Nordics.
We controlled for inherent interdependencies within
the networks by taking into account transitivity. This net-
work trait denotes the commonly found tendency of net-
work members to close triads, meaning that one is more
open for interactions with those that one already knows
indirectly through others (Goodreau, Kitts, & Morris,
2009). We operationalise this by including a statistic
called geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners
(GWESP) in our models. By measuring transitivity in this
way, we also account for the fact that there is a declin-
ing positive impact for each additional shared partner
(Snijders, Pattison, Robins, & Handcock, 2006).
4. Results
4.1. Network Visualisations and Community Detection
To gain insight into the patterns of interaction and the
component of Nordic cooperation within the context of
European policy implementation, we visualise all four
types of network interactions for each EAN (Figures 1
to 3). The identified communities are coloured differ-
ently and divided into separate clusters. This tells us
howmany communities were identified in each network
graph andwhether there is a Nordic community amongst
them. The squared nodes indicate which of the network
members are Nordic states.
First, as to the Administrative Commission, Sweden,
Denmark and Finland indeed belong to the same com-
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munity for all four types of interaction (see Figure 1).
However, they do not form a secluded community,
as this subnetwork comprises non-Nordic countries as
well. With regard to information exchange, this com-
munity is rather broad and at the core of the net-
work. Concerning the exchange of advice and best prac-
tices, the Nordics involve the Baltic states as well as
the United Kingdom and Ireland. Problem-solving in the
Administrative Commission shows the strongest Nordic
cooperation, as they belong to a separate community,
only including Latvia. Overall, Nordic cooperation is vis-
ible in the network coordinating social security systems,
while the Nordics are more integrated into the network
more generally.
Turning to the CBHC expert group, secondly, we
see that interactions are particularly clustered among
the Nordic states. While we have no data on Iceland,
we see that Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland
tend to exchange information, advice and best prac-
tices more than with their other European counterparts
(see Figure 2). To a somewhat lesser degree, this is also
true for problem-solving. When they do interact with
non-Nordic administrative units, these tend to be from
the Baltic states. Particularly the relationship between
Finland and Estonia is strong. Nordic cooperation thus
seems particularly strong when it comes to the exchange
or resources among national administrative units coordi-
nating healthcare on a European level.
Third, there is no clear Nordic community with-
in SOLVIT (see Figure 3). Iceland, Norway, Sweden,
Denmark and Finland are mostly part of separate com-
munities, interacting more with non-Nordic states than
with each other. This finding, which is in line with our
third expectation, shows that the Nordics are integrat-
Figure 1. Network visualisation of interactions in the Administrative Commission with community detection. Notes: Each
colour represents a different detected community. Nordic states are represented by a square; all others are represented
by a circle.
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Figure 2.Network visualisation of interactions in the CBHC expert groupwith community detection. Notes: Each colour rep-
resents a different detected community. Nordic states are represented by a square; all others are represented by a circle.
ed within the larger European context to the extent that
there is no clear sign of Nordic cooperation in the context
of internal market policy.
4.2. Modelling Nordic Cooperation Within European
Administrative Networks
To test the significance of Nordic cooperation, we devel-
oped an Exponential Random Graph Model for every
type of interaction in each EAN (see Table 1; Goodness of
Fit diagnostics are in the Supplementary File).We control
for transitivity, which tends to make interactions among
already indirectly related nodes more likely, and see
whether Nordic states interact significantly more with
one another than with other members. The structural
tendency to close triads is significant across networks
and interaction types, indicating an overall dense inter-
action level in EANs.
First, in line with our community detection, we find
significant Nordic cooperation within the Administrative
Commission when it comes to problem-solving. All else
being equal, the Nordics are almost twice more likely
to interact to solve problems with one another than
they are with other members of the Administrative
Commission (odds ratio = 1.90, p < 0.1). Odds ratios can
be calculated by exponentiating the relevant model coef-
ficient. We do not find similar effects for the exchange of
advice, best practices or information. This is likely due to
the fact, as indicated by the community detection stage,
that Nordic cooperation in this policy area does not pre-
clude interactions with other members.
Furthermore, we find particularly significant and
strong Nordic cooperation in the CBHC expert group,
for all types of interactions. Administrative units of
the Nordic states are more than five times as likely
to exchange advice with other Nordics than with non-
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Figure 3. Network visualisation of interactions in SOLVIT with community detection. Notes: Each colour represents a dif-
ferent detected community. Nordic states are represented by a square; all others are represented by a circle.
Nordic counterparts (odds ratio = 5.16, p < 0.05). This
effect is even stronger for the exchange of best prac-
tices, for which Nordic interactions are seven times
more likely (odds ratio = 7.25, p < 0.01). The effect is
strongest for information exchange: Here, interactions
with other Nordic members are more than nine times
as likely as interactions with non-Nordic members (odds
ratio = 9.23, p < 0.01). At the same time, problem-
solving among the Nordics is more than twice as likely
compared to the non-Nordic states (odds ratio = 2.35,
p < 0.01). This confirms our earlier descriptive finding
that, in the area of EU healthcare policies, Nordic coop-
eration is particularly strong.
Finally, we find no significant effect on Nordic coop-
eration concerning interactions between SOLVIT cen-
tres. In accordance with our community detection, the
Nordics are as likely to cooperate with each other as
they are with other European SOLVIT centres. Nordic
cooperation does not seem to be of any significance in
the internal market policy area, which is an area dis-
playing extensive European integration and no separate
Nordic integration.
In sum, Nordic cooperation is visible in EANs con-
cerning the implementation of both European health
and social policy. Interactions have a particularly Nordic
character in the area of healthcare. By contrast, we find
no Nordic clustering of interactions in the area of inter-
nal market policy. This supports our second expecta-
tion that Nordic cooperation is differentiated. In other
words, Nordic cooperation seems to depend on the level
of institutionalisation, which differs across policy areas.
The presence of both deeply-rooted Nordic welfare
models and existing Nordic cooperation that predates
European cooperation in the health and social welfare
policy domain, seem to underpin further Nordic coop-
eration. Vice versa, the Nordic component in European
cooperation is insignificant in internal market policy, an
area inwhichNordic cooperationwasweak to beginwith,
European integration being much more advanced.
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Table 1. Exponential Random Graph Models.
Administrative Commission CBHC expert group SOLVIT
Best Problem- Best Problem- Best Problem-
Advice practices Information solving Advice practices Information solving Advice practices Information solving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Density −2.511*** −4.518*** −2.522*** −2.695*** −4.018*** −4.751*** −4.754*** −3.860*** −2.850*** −4.035*** −1.888*** −6.046***
(0.402) (0.937) (0.935) (0.415) (0.674) (0.930) (0.903) (0.458) (0.335) (0.427) (0.316) (1.372)
Transitivity 0.572*** 2.378*** 1.243** 0.464** 0.435** 0.732*** 0.657*** 0.951*** 0.657*** 1.489*** 0.277* 3.575***
(0.206) (0.633) (0.573) (0.198) (0.200) (0.227) (0.226) (0.246) (0.198) (0.301) (0.159) (0.947)
Nordic 0.185 −0.237 −0.287 0.642* 1.642** 1.981** 2.222** 0.853** −0.067 0.219 −0.429 −0.291
cooperation (0.297) (0.217) (0.245) (0.351) (0.708) (0.960) (0.942) (0.423) (0.298) (0.235) (0.273) (0.183)
Akaike 363.845 422.075 478.906 370.537 257.861 238.760 281.893 274.984 285.774 309.138 376.154 555.310Inf. Crit.
Bayesian 375.650 433.880 490.711 382.342 269.880 250.779 293.912 287.003 298.200 321.564 388.580 567.736Inf. Crit.
Note: Levels of significance: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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5. Conclusion
Across the board, Nordic interactions have proven rather
resilient to European integration, contrary to the expec-
tation formulated in existing literature (Olesen & Strang,
2016; Sverdrup, 1998). Our study has shown that a
strong Nordic community still exists within the broad-
er European community when it comes to interactions
concerning the implementation and enforcement of EU
rules. This demonstrates that political orders can very
well overlap and exist simultaneously. Being part of a
larger political order does not inhibit Nordic cooperation.
In fact, we find that going Nordic is still very much appar-
ent within EANs.
However, the Nordic effect seems contingent on
the level of institutionalisation, which differs across
policy areas. Our findings support the differentiation
hypothesis on regional integration (Leruth et al., 2019;
Schimmelfennig et al., 2015). Nordic subnetworks in
EANs exist in those policy areas in which Nordic coopera-
tion predates European integration, and was maintained
in parallel to later EU developments. Both the estab-
lished cooperation and the institutional similarity of the
Nordic welfare model (Kettunen et al., 2016) appear to
ensure the preservation of Nordic cooperation in the
health and social welfare policy domain. The finding that
institutional similarity is crucial for selecting partners
for cooperation and lesson drawing (Rose, 1993) con-
firms earlier studies on transgovernmental interactions
(Efrat & Newman, 2017; Martinsen et al., 2020; Van Der
Heijden, 2019; Vantaggiato, 2019). Instead, in the strong-
ly Europeanised area of internal market policy, where
Nordic cooperationwas never very successful and a clear
Nordic model remained absent, we found no significant
Nordic cluster in interactions.
In addition to our finding that the Nordics tend to
interact with their Nordic counterparts in areas of pre-
vious Nordic cooperation and development of a Nordic
model, we find that there is a Baltic connection as well.
This indicates that Nordic cooperation may extend its
regional base, to the extent of including the Baltics.
Even though the Baltic states never really became offi-
cial players in Nordic cooperation (Olesen & Strang,
2016), initiatives from the 1990s to establish coopera-
tion frameworksmay have led to the development of this
Nordic–Baltic connection. The precise background of this
finding requires follow-up research.
In sum, the findings suggest a link between previous-
ly institutionalised Nordic interactions and the bilateral
interactions among officials in administrative units. The
exchange of resources such as information, best prac-
tices and advice as well as interactions to solve prob-
lems related to the implementation of EU policies in
the national context is clearly structured along institu-
tional dimensions shaped by Nordic cooperation. This
emphasises the importance of studying the actual inter-
actions that make up transnational bureaucracy (Strang,
2016; Sundelius, 1977; Sundelius &Wiklund, 1979, 2000)
and their networked structure (Martinsen et al., 2020;
Mastenbroek & Martinsen, 2018; Vantaggiato, 2019) to
assess the relevance of Nordic cooperation within the
broader political order.
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